KATHMANDU UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

3rd TEJSHREE MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2026

Corrections and Clarification

CORRECTIONS:

Particular	Current Text	Corrected to	Detail of the correction
Paragraph 13 of the Moot Problem	Jwalanta's document leaks led people online to denounce Kabyaniti as corrupt and to seek his resignation.	Jwalanta's document leaks led people online to denounce Kabyaniti as corrupt and to seek her resignation.	The pronoun 'his' is corrected to 'her'.
Paragraph 13 of the Moot Problem	No sooner had Jwalanta posted, "Do not forget the symbol of tyranny, Tej Mahal… #Burnitdown!" at 3.30 pm then the protestors had taken control of the Tej Mahal premises and set it ablaze.	No sooner had Jwalanta posted, 'Do not forget the symbol of tyranny, Tej Mahal… #Burnitdown!' at 3.30 pm than the protestors took control of the Tej Mahal premises and set it ablaze."	The word 'then' is corrected to 'than'.

The words 'had taken' have been removed and replaced with 'took'. |
| Paragraph 13 of the Moot Problem | Jwalanta shared the news and encouraged everyone repeatedly to join the cause, with his signature hashtag 'burn it down!' | Jwalanta shared the news and encouraged everyone repeatedly to join the cause, with his signature hashtag 'burn it down!'. | A 'full stop' is added at the end of the sentence. |
| Paragraph 14 of the Moot Problem | The reports added that Sauragya's effort on the night of 24 March 2024 fizzled out rather quickly as Tejshree forces were able to push them back into their own territory, with Sauragya's military suffering 4 casualties. | The reports added that Sauragya's effort in the afternoon of 23 March 2024 fizzled out rather quickly as Tejshree forces were able to push them back into their own territory, with Sauragya's military suffering 4 casualties. | The words 'on the night of 24 March 2024' have been replaced with 'in the afternoon of 23 March 2024'. |

CLARIFICATIONS

Q. No.	Question	Clarification
1.	From what source did Jwalanta obtain the emails and conversations involving Prime Minister Kabyaniti that were leaked in mid-March 2024?	There is no conclusive answer to this question. Initially, the popular consensus was that Jwalanta obtained the emails directly from one (or more) of the officials in (or working with) the Prime Minister's office. However, following the subsequent cyber-attack, many believe that the mid-March 2024 leak was also an outcome of hacking. The Tejshree government has not made a public statement on this matter.
2.	Were the leaked emails and documents accessed through official government systems, personal accounts, third-party sources, or any other means?	There is no conclusive answer to this question. See 1.
3.	Did Jwalanta obtain the leaked materials through hacking, unauthorized access, a whistleblower, lawful access, or some other method?	There is no conclusive answer to this question. See 1.
4.	Did Jwalanta personally participate in, direct, authorize, or have knowledge of any hacking or cyber intrusion used to obtain the leaked materials?	There is no conclusive answer to this question. See 1.
5.	Were the leaked emails and documents independently verified for authenticity, or is their genuineness disputed or under investigation?	Their genuineness was not disputed by anyone. However, different people have different interpretations on the content of the leaked emails and documents.
6.	Was there a dual-password, multi-level authentication, or other advanced security system in place for accessing the data allegedly leaked by Jwalanta?	There is no conclusive answer to this question (in relation to the mid-March 2024 leaks). See 1. However, in relation to the local software system, in their meetings with PM Kabyaniti, the leader of the development team had communicated to her that despite being new and untested, their native security system is 'state-of-the-art'.

7.	What was the precise nature of the cyber-attack carried out on 23 March 2024 (data deletion, data manipulation, system incapacitation, or a combination thereof)?	Data destruction, especially of all the backups of the digitally created NRS Treaty, and all the case files and associated evidences implicating Jwalanta.
8.	Did the cyber-attack cause permanent or critical impairment of Tejshree's governmental or judicial infrastructure, or was the damage temporary and recoverable?	Tejshree failed to recover the destroyed data. The cyber-attack had also impacted critical infrastructure at the time, including the dedicated power grid for the operation of data centers housed in Tej Mahal.
9.	Apart from media reports, what additional evidence exists regarding the origin of the alleged cyber-attack (such as forensic reports, intelligence assessments, or official findings)?	See 9.
10.	Is the cyber-attack conclusively attributed to actors operating from within the Sauragya Embassy in Tejshree, or is this attribution based on technical suspicion and media reporting?	The attribution is based on the investigation carried out by the Tejshree government using the available technology, which produces a very high but not definitive accuracy.
11.	Did Jwalanta have any direct or indirect access to cyber infrastructure, servers, or networks within the Sauragya Embassy in Tejshree?	There is a lack of clarity about the extent of Jwalanta's cyber access at Sauragya Embassy in Tejshree. However, during the investigation following the attacks, Tejshree obtained a classified Sauragya military dossier identifying Jwalanta as the "Head of Strategic Operations (Tejshree Desk)," a position held by a Colonel, with full authority to authorize cyber-offensives and coordinate special operation units deployed near the border.
12.	Is there any direct evidence linking Jwalanta to the planning, coordination, initiation, or execution of the cyber-attack?	See 11.
13.	Was Jwalanta physically present inside the Sauragya Embassy during the protests on 23 March 2024, or was he located elsewhere at that time?	See 14.

14.	At what exact time did Jwalanta enter the Sauragya Embassy, and did he remain there continuously thereafter?	Jwalanta entered the Sauragya Embassy in January 2024. The exact time of his entry was never communicated by the Embassy (or Jwalanta himself), and is therefore not publicly known. He remained in the Embassy throughout and is suspected to have left the Embassy and the country on 23 March 2024 (the exact time of the day unknown).
15.	Was Jwalanta formally granted diplomatic asylum by the Sauragya Embassy, or was he merely sheltered without formal legal recognition?	Yes, he was granted asylum by the Embassy.
16.	Is Jwalanta conclusively established as a citizen of Tejshree, or does the allegation of forged or disputed citizenship remain unresolved?	No clarification necessary.
17.	Does Jwalanta hold citizenship or nationality of any other State apart from Tejshree?	No clarification necessary.
18.	Was there an open border regime between Tejshree and Sauragya at the relevant time?	Yes.
19.	What are the specific dates or periods during which Tejshree allegedly accused Sauragya of repeated border encroachments?	No clarification necessary.
20.	The problem states that Sauragya allegedly attempted to occupy Simana on the night of 24 March 2024—was this based on confirmed official reports or unverified media sources?	No clarification necessary. See correction no. 4.
21.	Did Tejshree and Sauragya maintain any arms, defence, or military trade relationship during 2023 and 2024?	Tejshree stopped buying weapons from Sauragya since Kabyaniti came to power.
22.	Were the new 2024 Sauragya-manufactured weapons actually used during the protests of 23 March 2024, or were they merely found in the possession of protestors?	No clarification necessary.

23.	If used, did the weapons include explosives, heavy weaponry, or only small arms?	The police recovered a wide variety of weapons.
24.	Is there evidence that Jwalanta had prior knowledge that protestors would be armed?	No clarification necessary.
25.	Were the protests of 23 March 2024 centrally organized by identifiable leaders, or were they spontaneous and decentralized in nature?	It is for each team to assess the matter in their arguments.
26.	Did Jwalanta have any direct or private communications (messages, calls, emails, or encrypted chats) with protest organizers apart from public social media posts?	It is unclear. However, Jwalanta was one of the members of the JPM group, even though he did not have any active interaction in the group.
27.	What was the exact number of followers Jwalanta had at the relevant time?	On 23 March 2024, Jwalanta had a total of 492,871 followers on social media.
28.	Are there verified figures for views, reach, and impressions generated by Jwalanta's posts during the protest period, particularly between 3:30 PM and 5:30 PM on 23 March 2024?	Jwalanta's 23 March post, like most of his other posts, was the most viewed post in Tejshree on the day of the attack.
29.	At what point, if any, did Jwalanta become aware that the protests had escalated into violence?	No clarification necessary.
30.	Did Jwalanta continue posting messages such as "burn it down" after becoming aware of the violence?	No clarification necessary.
31.	Is the phrase "burn it down" intended to be interpreted literally, as political rhetoric, or is its interpretation deliberately left open to the parties?	It is for each team to assess the matter in their arguments.
32.	Did Jwalanta moderate, administer, or exercise control over online groups such as "Jwalanta for PM (JPM)"?	It is for each team to assess the matter in their arguments.
33.	Is there an official list distinguishing government buildings and private buildings that were burned or damaged during the protests?	While nearly 70% of the damaged buildings belonged to the government, 24 private buildings (including seven of the largest commercial spaces in the country) were damaged.

34.	Were any of the government buildings destroyed on 23 March 2024 used for military, intelligence, or security purposes at the time of destruction?	11 buildings used by the police were destroyed. The central intelligence unit operated from the Tej Mahal (alongside other offices, including, most notably, the prime minister's office). No military premises were damaged.
35.	Was Tej Mahal guarded by armed or military personnel, or used for security, intelligence, or military functions when it was set ablaze?	See 34.
36.	Did Jwalanta have prior knowledge that the NRS Treaty or related evidence was stored in Tej Mahal or other buildings later destroyed?	No clarification necessary.
37.	Are the reported civilian and official casualties attributable solely to protestor actions, or also to the use of force by State authorities?	A majority of all the civilian deaths was caused by burning.
38.	Paragraph 12 on page 9 refers to certain documents—were these documents later found to be genuine, forged, or still under verification?	See 5.
39.	Out of all the news reports referenced in the moot problem, which were later confirmed as false, and which remain unverified?	No clarification necessary.
40.	Paragraph 17 mentions that on 13 September an aircraft heading to Sauragya Bhoomi was diverted to Travan—kindly clarify from which country the aircraft originated and its intended route.	The flight departed from Bhaskarkshetra (the Capital of Bhaskargadhi) for Sauragyabhumi.
41.	Paragraph 10 states that final findings would involve international independent experts—has this process been completed, and have the findings been officially verified?	The post-protest investigation documents reveal that Tejshree had intended to verify the final findings from seven independent experts. Only four of them were able to see and verify. Out of them, two approved the digital reconstruction without reservation, while one approved with certain reservations. For the remaining expert, additional work needed to be done for approval.

		The three remaining experts were unable to see and verify the Treaty, as it was destroyed.
42.	Where did Jwalanta complete his schooling?	Jwalanta had a peripatetic childhood, and did his schooling in Tejshree, Sauragya and Bhaskargadhi.
43.	Did Jwalanta obtain any degree from the University of Sauragya, and if so, what was the nature of that degree?	Jwalanta obtained a PhD from the University of Sauragya. His thesis was entitled, 'Time to wake up now: how Sauragya should revive and reclaim the Ekrajya'.
44.	What are the legal thresholds or requirements under Tejshree's domestic law to formally file charges of espionage?	This is not relevant to the points on which the court expects to hear.
45.	Is there any pending or ongoing domestic investigation or prosecution against Jwalanta at the time of the ICC proceedings?	No cases other than those specified in paragraph 11 of the Moot Problem are pending against Jwalanta in Tejshree courts. However, Tejshree is conducting an investigation into Jwalanta, as part of its larger investigation into the 23 March attacks.
46.	Is the alleged cyber-attack intended to qualify as a "use of armed force" for the purposes of Article 8 bis, or is this legal threshold deliberately left open for argument?	It is for each team to assess the matter in their arguments.
47.	Can the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) be relied upon for legal arguments in this moot problem, even though the problem does not explicitly state whether Tejshree and Sauragya are parties to the Convention?	Tejshree and Sauragya are both parties to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) 1963.
48.	When did the parties sign the Rome Statute?	Tejshree and Sauragya became parties to the ICC Rome Statute in the mid 2000s. Titrawang is not a party to the Rome Statute.

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