By Ms. Tamanna Bhattarai, a third-year law student of the BBM- LL.B program
Abstract:
South Asia, home to over a quarter of the population of the world and some of its poorest societies, is also one of the most climate-exposed regions of the world. But despite common environmental issues such as sea level rise, melting glaciers, and extreme weather, regional action on climate change is perilously behind schedule. This blog explores the historical trajectory and current stagnation of South Asia’s regional climate diplomacy, unpacking the institutional poor performance of SAARC and mounting political polarisation, particularly between India and Pakistan, that has led to collective action failure. It assesses the spread of public announcements and guidelines with little follow-up, failure to launch cooperative disaster response or cross-border early warning systems, and segmented efforts on climate finance, sharing information, and emission targets. Through examples from countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and India, the blog highlights the fractured nature of climate action in the region, more characterised by national plans and bilateral initiatives than regional coordination. The blog argues that the region’s “climate silence” is not an expression of ignorance or wish, but political mistrust, institutional fragility, and gatekeeping bureaucracies. It is urging South Asia to speedily move from cooperative performance towards functional integration, starting small through data transparency, scientific collaboration, and people-centred, cross-border projects, to turn shared climate exposure into shared resilience.
Introduction:
One of the world’s most climate-vulnerable areas is South Asia, with its long coastlines and monsoon-reliant agriculture. Its rapidly melting Himalayan glaciers threaten water, food, and livelihoods across borders. The stakes are high since the region has over 25% of the world’s population, a third of its poor. In spite of such common threats, regional climate cooperation has continued to be at a standstill. Even when Cyclone Biparjoy struck Pakistan and India in mid-2023, there was no indication of coordination between the two nations. In another case, local officials blamed upstream dams in Bhutan, a friendly neighbouring country, for the catastrophic floods in Assam, India, even though Bhutan experienced floods too. These episodes illustrate a familiar pattern: South Asian countries have shared climatic shocks but rarely coordinate their response.
Historical Overview of Regional Climate Initiatives:
SAARC (the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), founded in 1985 by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives (and later joined by Afghanistan), has been discussing environmental issues at its summits from the very beginning. The third SAARC Summit in 1987 called for a regional study on natural disasters, and in 1988, a study on the greenhouse effect. SAARC environment ministers adopted the SAARC Environment Action Plan in 1997, and in 2006, they endorsed the “Comprehensive Framework on Disaster Management (2006-2015)” to synchronise with the international Hyogo Framework. The SAARC ministers signed the Dhaka Declaration and Action Plan on Climate Change in July 2008, and climate was the focus of the 16th SAARC Summit in Thimphu in 2010. The summit created an Inter-Governmental Expert Group on Climate Change to monitor progress, and a “SAARC Convention on Cooperation on Environment” was signed in 2010 (entered into force in 2013) covering 19 areas from forest conservation to renewable energy. In 2011, SAARC nations even signed a Rapid Response Mechanism for Natural Disasters. Despite these declarations, implementation has been poor. SAARC environment ministers met nine times from 1992 to 2011, but not since 2011. (There was a one-off tsunami ministers’ meeting in Malé in 2005, and a climate summit in Dhaka in 2008, but no regular follow-up.) Likewise, after the 2010 Thimphu Statement, SAARC summits were suspended; the last summit was in 2014. In brief, several SAARC declarations and committees were set up, but the institutional apparatus never developed into a feasible platform for action.
Geopolitical Tensions and Institutional Stagnation:
Climate policy had become secondary to regional politics by the 2010s. The main fault line is still the antagonism between India and Pakistan, which has paralysed SAARC and resulted in meetings being indefinitely delayed since 2014. (The SAARC Secretariat states it “has not met since” that time.) Although it includes Thailand and, in practice, excludes countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) has some members from South Asia. The project does not cover the entire South Asian region, and any cooperative climate strategy is limited in extent. Indeed, South Asia lacks a comprehensive regional forum such as Southeast Asia’s ASEAN. The political impasse is intensified by a culture of secrecy and suspicion. Hydrological and environmental data are jealously guarded by South Asian governments, undermining trust. Indian officials consider all data on transboundary rivers that flow into Pakistan, Afghanistan, or Bangladesh to be secret. Transboundary water management is controlled by elite insiders because there is no public sharing of information. Opacity slows cross-border research on the Indus, Ganga, and Brahmaputra basins as well as planning and scientific activities. Institutional weaknesses worsen all these issues.
SAARC specialised committees, such as on paper, are not backed by political will and financing. SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC), established in 2006 and later integrated with meteorological and forestry institutes, does not hold regular multinational exercises; in fact, only one “South Asian Annual Disaster Management Exercise” has been held (in 2015). In the absence of political champions, disaster response coordination is a formality. Since national bureaucracies hold back information, South Asia has dragged its feet, lacking the political will to facilitate transboundary institutions. Nepal-India cooperation in the Koshi River dates back to a 1954 treaty (amended in 1966), and still, Bihar experiences annual floods, demonstrating how regional interests are usually trumped by domestic agendas. The issue is not just whether the countries communicate, but who is permitted to communicate. Narrow technical focus in practice and bureaucrats in opaque agencies decide water flows, making diplomacy nigh impossible.
Energy and Emissions Coordination:
South Asia’s energy markets are dispersed. There are ambitious plans and numerous delays for a regional power market and electrical infrastructure, particularly for renewables. Cross-border transmission lines have been suggested by India and pushing the concept of a global renewables grid. Political tensions, nevertheless, interfere with such plans. Even a simple regional power deal has proved elusive, with past meetings points of diplomatic bitterness. South Asian economies mostly do energy alone: India’s huge solar push and coal drive are national initiatives more than regionally coordinated ones, and each country strikes its deals and financing. Similarly, there is no common framework for emissions reduction.
All South Asian nations (except the Maldives) submitted Paris Agreement NDCs, but these were nationally determined, rather than regional. Briefly, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka pledged 5–10% cuts (conditional on support) by 2030, Pakistan pledged 20% (conditional), and India pledged up to a 35% reduction in carbon intensity by 2030. Nepal’s NDC does not refer to any specified cut (it is already low-carbon with 100% hydroelectricity). It lacks a regional carbon market or emissions trading in common; countries align with their global negotiating groupings (India with BASIC, Bangladesh/Nepal within LDCs, etc.) rather than a South Asia grouping.
Climate Finance:
Climate action finance in South Asia is a country-by-country affair. To realise their intended climate actions until 2030, South Asian countries would need to spend a total of around $1.76 trillion, or $200 billion annually. On the other hand, the amount of global climate finance that has actually arrived in South Asia has been woefully limited. From 2002 to 2021, the nations garnered an average of about $1.25 billion annually, of which about 75% was obtained by India and 12% by Bangladesh alone. In other words, investment in climate change in the region is a pittance compared to what is required.
Countries have to arrange their finances on their own. Following the 2022 Pakistan floods that resulted in an estimated $15.2 billion in economic losses, Pakistan unveiled a National Climate Finance Strategy at COP29. Bangladesh also initiated a “Climate and Development Platform” in 2023, in collaboration with banks, to develop climate programs and financing solutions. These are welcome developments, but are bilateral or national in nature rather than multilateral cooperation. There is no South Asian climate fund, including SAARC’s Development Fund or any donor organisation, that is specially established to distribute funds regionally for mitigation or adaptation. Additional climate finance from overseas could easily be channelled into projects that would benefit millions of South Asians, were there a coherent regional mechanism.
Disaster Preparedness and Resilience:
South Asia is hit by cyclones, heatwaves, floods, and droughts every year, and yet preparedness for disasters is weak. SAARC established the SDMC and even signed an agreement for quick disaster response, but follow-up has been limited. There has been just a single South Asian Disaster Management Exercise ever conducted (in 2015). Standardised cross-border alerts from national early warning systems, which are largely national in focus, are limited. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India each have their own cyclone warning institutions, for instance. States infrequently declare relief if floods or storms pass across international borders; during Biparjoy, for example, Pakistan and India did not appear to coordinate. In short, common early warning systems, shared evacuation plans, or regional contingency funds have yet to be established. South Asian governments have shown limited political will to make transboundary institutions stronger, and by holding data hostage, they have limped along with token cooperation only.
Country Perspectives:
The region’s largest economy and emitter, India, has sought high-profile climate leadership positions (such as G20 commitments and global solar alliances) but is wary of regional initiatives. India’s NDC aims for a reduction of carbon intensity by 33-35% by 2030. Typically lacking a South Asian dimension, it has invested in disaster resilience (e.g., cyclone shelters) and national adaptation (Ahmedabad’s heat response plan has saved thousands of lives). India initiated the Coalition for Disaster-Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) that now includes several regional nations, but SAARC itself is largely moribund under the shadow of India–Pakistan politics.
Pakistan’s climate risk led to devastating floods in 2022, affecting over 33 million people. Its leadership raised the alarm globally (in COP27, Pakistan pushed for a Loss and Damage Fund).
At home, it initiated its first climate finance policy (at COP29) and is looking for international support for revival. However, Pakistan’s climate diplomacy is also besmirched by a confidence deficit with India; even during Cyclone Biparjoy, there was “no sign of cooperation” with Indian authorities. In brief, Pakistan’s climate agenda is urgent but largely nationalised, revolving around obtaining foreign finance and technology.
Bangladesh has emerged as a global champion of adaptation despite being one of the most vulnerable countries to cyclones and sea level rise. It has made massive investments in durable housing, cyclone shelters, and early warning systems. Bangladesh’s cyclone preparedness has saved lives by a significant number, from over half a million in the 1970 Bhola cyclone to less than 5,000 in more recent cyclones, in one estimate. Given its development aspirations, Bangladesh’s NDC (2030) is modest and varies between a decrease of 5–10% and a conditional 15–24% depending on finance. It has collaborated with banks to launch the 2023 Climate & Development Platform and is an active advocate for climate finance in forums. Though Bangladesh and other countries have bilateral water cooperation, regional mechanisms for addressing issues like the Teesta River dispute are few. It also supported SAARC climate initiatives in the 2000s but now functions mainly on its own or through collaborations with international funds.
Nepal is a hilly nation with serious dangers from altered monsoon patterns and glacier retreat. Nepal has attempted to collaborate with China and India on water and energy, as its economy and food security rely on Himalayan rivers. Nepal has concurred with India on the Kosi and Mahakali rivers, but the result is blended; recurring floods in India are a signal of implementation loopholes. Nepal participated in the SAARC climate talks, but its individual priorities are rural adaptation and forest management. Nepal’s NDC, in contrast to those of most of its neighbours, does not call for specific emission reductions because the country already has relatively low growth and widespread hydropower.
Bhutan has a carbon-negative economy owing to its extensive forests and hydropower exports to India. It has virtually zero emissions growth to cut back, and it was not even included in the said six-country NDC study. Although Bhutan has pushed for environmental concerns in international fora (with a focus on sustainability and happiness), it follows India’s lead in the sector. For instance, Bhutan approved big dams with Indian financing, but its own ministers have had little opportunity to debate the downstream effects in Assam, which often blames Bhutan for floods. Bhutan has no independent climate mechanism, although the nation is worried about shifting monsoons and glacier lakes. SAARC’s environment institutes in Thimphu and Islamabad address forestry and meteorology, but their work is not widely understood.
Sri Lanka is vulnerable to rising sea levels and drought in the inland. Sri Lanka’s modest NDC is an unconditional emissions cut of around 10%. It has several national resilience schemes, such as mangrove restoration, and has recently invested in early warning systems. Sri Lanka was a participant in SAARC until 2014, although its political loyalty has swung between India and China. Ever since the SAARC freeze, Sri Lanka, which is a lower-middle-income nation rather than an LDC, has interacted to some degree with small groups. It also lacks a special regional climate forum, but its disaster professionals do take part in SAARC meetings on disasters occasionally, which have not been convened for years.
The Maldivian islands, physically located at a height of roughly one meter above sea level, are South Asia’s poster child for climatic catastrophe. Malé has repeatedly warned that if the oceans rise, it will be submerged. Maldives already has 99% of its electricity from renewables (wind and solar), so its NDC is also low. International lobbying is the main focus of diplomatic activity; the Maldives is an active participant in UN forums and played a key role in hosting the high-profile Malé Declaration on Climate Change (2005). It has ad hoc discussions with India on environmental technology support, but lacks a SAARC-wide climate forum.
Each South Asian nation is confronting climate change, but almost all are looking for national solutions. They all have different policies, and their adaptation needs are dramatically different. Most critically, none of these nations has chosen to coordinate a regional climate response. Informally, they might share ideas, but there is no mechanism linking their climate policy or finance.
Sectoral Takeaways and Missed Opportunities:
There are tangible costs to a dearth of collaboration. Consider renewable energy: a South Asian integrated power market can reduce cost and emissions by selling India’s excess solar to its neighbours, but politics has thus far stalled connectivity infrastructure or any trade zone. A regional early warning system is nonexistent despite the fact that mutual support and shared early warning can save lives in disaster management. One South Asia climate fund, however small, might be a catalyst for cross-border initiatives. The bigger implications are catastrophic. As Dialogue Earth points out, “the rigid borders of South Asia…are ill-suited to the challenges of the 21st century,” because glaciers and monsoons pay no heed to national boundaries.
While India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and others proceed individually with climate action, they would all incur unnecessary costs. Global climate objectives can also be damaged because of the size and emissions of South Asia, making its involvement or lack thereof important to the rest of the world. Cooperation should be natural because of the common problems in the region, yet it is not. They recommend beginning small because subnational initiatives and collaborative scientific studies, like those on the Himalayan glaciers, may create trust before larger diplomatic obstacles are addressed. Lastly, South Asia’s climate silence is also a product of its polarised politics and weak institutions. The answer may not be to get governments to do more, but simply to do less gatekeeping, unlock data, open channels, and let communities work together across borders. Until then, the region will lose valuable opportunities to transform its collective climate hardship into shared resilience, and its climate vulnerabilities will continue to outpace its climate diplomacy.